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Abstract 
 
This paper is a contribution to the English School’s theory of primary 
institutions. It offers a historical and structural enquiry into the meaning 
of great power management (GPM) as a primary institution of 
international society as it has evolved since the 18th century. We seek 
to uncover the driving forces that shape this primary institution, and 
how they are working to redefine its legitimacy in the 21st century. We 
are particularly interested in uncovering whether and how particular 
conditions in international systems/societies facilitate or obstruct the 
operation of GPM. The paper examines how system structures, both 
material and ideational, have set different conditions for GPM. Using 
the evolution from traditional to non-traditional security as a template, it 
sets out the main functions that have evolved for GPM. It shows how 
the institution has quite different meanings and roles at different times, 
and how they play into the legitimacy that GPM requires. It considers 
how GPM works at both regional and global levels, and concludes by 
both looking ahead at the prospects for GPM, and opening a 
discussion on how to relate GPM to global governance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The idea of great power management (GPM) stands prominently within 
the English school approach to IR. It is one of the five classical primary 
institutions (PIs) of international society identified by Bull, the other four 
being war, diplomacy, international law and the balance of power.2 In 
Bull’s formulation, great powers not only assume themselves, but are 
also recognised by others, to have managerial rights and 
responsibilities for international order. This idea is also present in 
hegemonic stability theory, and up to a point in global governance. The 
key to great power management as an institution of international 
society is that the powers concerned attract legitimacy to support their 
unequal status as leaders by accepting special responsibilities as well 
as claiming special rights.3 They do this both by displaying good 
manners and by efficiently providing public goods, though in theory 
and in practice, GPM norms can be driven by calculation or coercion. 
Holsti shows how the institution of GPM emerged along with the 
balance of power during the 18th and 19th centuries as replacements 
for a declining dynastic principle.4 
 
Recently, especially with the rise of China, India and other 
non-Western powers, there has been growing interest in great powers 
and their roles and responsibilities in international society.5 There has 
                                                        
2 Although the discussion of classical primary institutions focuses mainly on the five 
that Bull discusses at length, he also notes that ‘it is states themselves that are the 
principal institutions of international society’. This means that sovereignty and 
territoriality, which are the defining principles for modern states, should be added to 
the other five. A good case can be made for adding nationalism, which since the 19th 
century has become a key constitutive principle for the modern state. See, Hedley 
Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 
1977), p. 71; James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). For discussion of primary institutions see Barry 
Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal 
Approach (Cambridge: Polity, 2014).  
3 Ian Clark, ‘Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony’, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2009), pp. 207-20; Mlada Bukovansky, Ian 
Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 
Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), pp. 26-27.  
4 Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: armed conflicts and international order 1648-1989 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 71-82, 114-37.  
5 Jamie Gaskarth, ed., China, India and the Future of International Society (London: 
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been a particular focus on China, which is pressured from without to 
become a more responsible great power, and from within to balance 
the domestic political needs of the Chinese Communist Party with the 
necessity to engage in a Western-defined global economic order.6 
More broadly, there has been interest in how rising powers gain the 
‘legitimate’ great power status in ‘recognition games’,7 and some 
discussions on the legitimacy of power.8 But with a few exceptions 
there has been surprisingly little attention to the meaning of GPM itself 
as a primary institution.9 Our study makes a broader historical and 
structural enquiry into the meaning of GPM as it has evolved since the 
18th century, seeking to uncover the driving forces that shape this 
primary institution, and how they are working to redefine its legitimacy 
in the 21st century. We are particularly interested in uncovering 
whether and how particular conditions in international 
systems/societies facilitate or obstruct the operation of GPM. 
 
In the classical formulation, GPM is closely related to another of the 
classical primary institutions, balance of power (BoP),10 which some 
writers take to be the fundamental enabling condition for international 
society.11 A BoP is seen as necessary to preserve a system of 
sovereign states from both endless war, and domination by some form 
of universal empire. Great powers are a likely, though not absolutely 
inevitable, consequence of an anarchic system of states (likely 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Rowman and Littlefield, 2015).  
6 Catherine Jones, ‘Constructing great powers: China’s status in a socially constructed 
plurality’, International Politics, Vol. 51, No. 5 (2014), pp. 597-618. 
7 See especially, Shogo Suzuki, ‘Seeking “Legitimate” Great Power Status in Post-Cold 
War International Society: China’s and Japan’s Participation in UNPKO’, International 
Relations, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2008).  
8  Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Power, Legitimacy, and Order’, The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2014), pp. 341-59.  
9  See, for example, Richard Little, ‘The Balance of Power and Great Power 
Management’, in Richard Little and John Williams, eds., The Anarchical Society in a 
Globalized World (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), pp.97-120; Alexander Astrov, ‘Great 
Power Management: English School Meets Governmentality?’, E-International 
Relations, 20 May 2013, http://www.e-ir.info; Jorge Lasmar, ‘Managing Great Powers 
in the Post-Cold War World: Old Rules New Game? The Case of the Global War on 
Terror’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2015).  
10 Little, ‘The Balance of Power and Great Power Management’, pp. 109-13.  
11 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 106-17; Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, 
Values and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 32, 51; Clark, ‘Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony’, pp. 203-5, 
220-23.  
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because the number of possible unequal distributions of power is 
much greater that the possibility of a more or less equal distribution of 
power). Where great powers exist, they will be the principal players in 
the BoP, and GPM will have as its starting point the management of 
the BoP. As Little argues, in English School theory what he calls an 
‘associational’ BoP is necessarily a social construction in which states 
in general and great powers in particular agree to treat the balance of 
power as a key principle in regulating their relationships.12 This 
understanding contrasts with the mechanical or ‘adversarial’ 
conception of BoP in realism in which states balance automatically 
against distributions of power they find threatening. It is the 
associational conception of BoP as something agreed amongst the 
great powers that underpins the strong link between BoP and GPM. 
 
The nexus between BoP and GPM in English School theory provides 
close links to other mainstream IR theories, both those that put great 
powers at centre stage, such as realism and liberalism (and especially 
the ‘neo’ versions of both), and those that emphasise the ideational 
structure of the international system, most obviously constructivism 
and up to a point liberalism. As Waltz argues: ‘The greater the relative 
size of a unit the more it identifies its own interest with the interest of 
the system…. In any realm populated by units that are functionally 
similar but of different capability, those of greatest capability take on 
special responsibilities.’13 Hegemonic stability theory builds on this 
insight to argue that management of the global economy is best done 
by a single hegemonic great power, and that such economic 
management should be part of great power responsibilities.14 
 
                                                        
12 Little, ‘The Balance of Power and Great Power Management’, pp. 109-13; Richard 
Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations; Metaphors, Myths and Models, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 157-58.  
13 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading MA.: Addison-Wesley, 
1979), p. 198. 
14 Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 72-80; 
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen D. Krasner, ‘State 
Power and the Structure of International Trade’, World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1976), 
pp. 317-47. 
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As many have noted,15 because GPM strongly implies collective 
hegemony, it necessarily stands in some tension with the idea of 
sovereign equality that sits at the heart of modern international society. 
Despite the foundational importance of sovereign equality to modern 
international society, even after decolonization that society is still 
riddled with the hegemonic/hierarchical practices and inequalities of 
status left over from its founding process, and largely favouring great 
powers in particular and the West in general.16 Bukovansky et al. note 
that a consensual collective hegemony can be seen as a middle 
ground between sovereign equality and imposed great power 
primacy.17 They also note that civilizational traditions differ here, with 
the Western tradition strongly opposed to hierarchy and the Northeast 
Asian one more accepting of it. 
 
The key to GPM is that great powers assume ‘special rights and 
responsibilities’.18 It is about a quid pro quo, in which lesser states 
legitimise a degree of sovereign inequality in return for the provision of 
order that only the great powers have the capacity and the will to 
provide. This inequality takes the form of great powers forming a club 
in which they recognize each other as equals at a higher level, and 
enjoy privileged positions in intergovernmental organizations. In return 
they take responsibility for upholding the core norms of international 
society.19 The consensual element in this deal is what distinguishes 
                                                        
15 See, for example, Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 106-12; Gerry Simpson, Great 
Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ronnie Hjorth, ‘Equality in the 
theory of international society: Kelsen, Rawls and the English School’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2011), pp. 2591-98.  
16 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992), 
pp. 299-309, 319-25; Adam Watson, The Limits of Independence: Relations Between 
States in the Modern World (London: Routledge, 1997); Gerritt W. Gong, The Standard 
of 'Civilization' in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 7-21; Ian 
Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Benedict Kingsbury, 'Sovereignty 
and Inequality', in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, eds., Inequality, Globalization, 
and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 66-94; Simpson, Great 
Powers and Outlaw States; Hurrell, On Global Order, pp. 13, 35-6, 63-5, 71, 111-14; 
Barry Buzan, ‘Culture and International Society’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1 
(2010), pp.1-25. 
17 Bukovansky, et al., Special Responsibilities, pp. 5-11, 34-45.  
18 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 74.  
19 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States; Suzuki, ‘Seeking “Legitimate” Great 
Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society’, p.50.  
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GPM from mere material hegemony, suzerainty, or in Clark’s terms 
‘primacy’,20 based on intimidation. Both Wight and Bull note that the 
minimalist, state-centric position of classical international society tends 
to support the status quo: in Wight’s terms, it ‘makes a presumption in 
favour of existing international society’.21 Within that, GPM by 
definition looks like a predominantly status quo institution.22 But as we 
hope to show, under certain conditions it can also be revisionist. 
 
The next section provides a brief overview and periodisation of how 
GPM has evolved in modern international society. Section 3 looks at 
how system structures, both material and ideational, have set different 
conditions for GPM. Section four surveys the main functions that have 
evolved for GPM, giving the institution a quite different meaning and 
role at different times. Section 5 looks ahead to the likely shape of 
GPM in the coming decades, and section 6 concludes by looking at 
how GPM relates to the rival concept of global governance.  
 
2. The Evolution of GPM: an overview 
 
Great power management is in a sense implicit in all of the big 
war-settling congresses from 1648 onwards. Like the BoP, not only the 
logic and legitimacy of great power interests, but also the principle of 
GPM, grew as the dynastic principle weakened. The BoP emerged as 
a principle of European international politics after the Treaty of Utrecht 
(1713), when it began conspicuously to challenge dynastic principles 
as a key institution for regulating relations among states.23 The 
                                                        
20 Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), pp. 23-8.  
21 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. 134; Hedley Bull, 
‘Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations’, in Martin Wight, 
International Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. xi.  
22 Suzuki, ‘Seeking “Legitimate” Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International 
Society’, p. 47.  
23 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 101-06; Holsti, Peace and War: armed conflicts and 
international order 1648-1989, pp. 71-89; Watson, The Evolution of International 
Society, pp. 198-213; Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp.71-84; Edward Keene, ‘The Naming of Powers’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2013), pp. 268-282.  
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principle of BoP was then enshrined in the Treaty of Vienna (1815).24 
The emergence of GPM as a corollary of BoP tracks this pattern 
closely. Holsti argues that the practice of GPM becomes much more 
evident and formalised from the Treaty of Vienna onwards, most 
notably in the Concert of Europe.25 Simpson defines this process as a 
shift from the relatively pure and undifferentiated practice of sovereign 
equality set up at Westphalia, to a quite strong form of ‘legalised 
hegemony’ in which great powers saw themselves, and were 
recognised by others to have, managerial responsibility for 
international order.26  
 
The link between BoP and GPM has remained strong for much of the 
19th and 20th centuries, and can be understood in terms of Little’s 
distinction between ‘adversarial’ and ‘associational’ balancing noted 
above, which exposes a markedly fluctuating pattern of BoP/GPM. 
GPM is closely tied to an associational balance of power, with the 
strength of adversarial balancing and great power management being 
inversely correlated. Associational balancing and the ‘legalized 
hegemony’ of GPM flourished for much of the 19th century as 
embodied in the Concert of Europe, and briefly after the First and 
Second World Wars with the formation of the League of Nations (LN) 
and the United Nations (UN). Adversarial balancing predominated in 
the run-ups to the First and Second World Wars, and throughout the 
Cold War, when GPM became weak.  
 
But even within these swings, the principle of GPM and ‘legalised 
hegemony’ became institutionally consolidated from the LN onward. 
From 1919, the practice was to design intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) around a dual, hybrid arrangement in which the 
principle of sovereign equality was embedded in a general assembly, 
                                                        
24 Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), pp. 134-40; Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, pp. 96-7.  
25 Holsti, Peace and War, pp. 114-37; see also Martin Wight, Systems of States 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp. 42, 136-41. In a later and otherwise 
excellent work, Holsti somewhat surprisingly, and on what to us seem like thin 
grounds, rejects both BoP and GPM as institutions. On this question we prefer the 
earlier Holsti to the later one, and stay with the English School’s general view that 
both are institutions of international society. See, Kalevi J. Holsti, Taming the 
Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 25-6.  
26 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States. See also, Watson, The Evolution of 
International Society, pp. 138-262. 
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and the principle of GPM was embedded in an elite council.27 Bull’s 
famous castigation of the two superpowers during the Cold War as ‘the 
great irresponsibles’, reflected the dominance of adversarial balancing 
at that time, and the consequent failure of the US and the Soviet Union 
to take adequate responsibility for managing international society.28 
Yet even within the Cold War, the two superpowers spent some effort 
negotiating arms control agreements which both recognized their 
equality in this area, and aimed to increase their own, and the rest of 
the world’s, chances of survival. There was also some tacit 
acknowledgement of spheres of influence, most obviously in Europe. 
Although their antagonism prevented them from doing much by way of 
taking responsibility for GPM, the US and the Soviet Union 
nonetheless enjoyed a considerable measure of ‘legalized hegemony’ 
in relation to the rest of international society, a status acknowledged in 
the term ‘superpower’ itself. 
 
The parallel between BoP and GPM breaks down after 1989, when the 
unchallenged rise of the US as the sole superpower raised doubts 
about the basic principle of BoP, but caused much less disturbance to 
GPM. Post Cold War, the US was perfectly willing to see itself as the 
leader and to claim privileges for itself on the basis of GPM.29 Up to a 
point, the US retained followers, though after 2001 under the Bush 
administration it moved away from the principle of legalized hegemony, 
and operated more on the basis of material primacy, not seeming to 
care much whether anyone followed its lead or not. Its legitimacy as 
leader consequently declined.30 Hurrell rightly posed the question: 
‘How stable and how legitimate can a liberal order be when it depends 
heavily on the hegemony of the single superpower whose history is so 
exceptionalist and whose attitude to international law and institutions 
has been so ambivalent?’.31 Morris argues that the US sullied its 
normative opportunity by its unilateral and coercive approach to 
                                                        
27 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, pp. 147-93.  
28 Bull, ‘The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, The Soviet Union and World 
Order’, International Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (1980).  
29 Clark, Hegemony in International Society. 
30 Andrew Hurrell, ‘“There are no Rules” (George W. Bush): International Order after 
September 11’, International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2002), p. 202; Hurrell, On 
Global Order, pp. 262-83; Barry Buzan, ‘A Leader Without Followers? The United 
States in World Politics after Bush’, International Politics, Vol. 45, No. 5 (2008), pp. 
554-70.  
31 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Foreword to the Third Edition: The Anarchical Society 25 Years 
On’, in Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. xxii.  
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promoting its liberal agenda.32 Dunne and Lasmar even question 
whether after 9/11 US policy amounted to a kind of unilateralist attempt 
at hyperpower status, moving it outside of international society.33 This 
interpretation raises the possibility of a hyperpower still playing a 
managing role on the basis of primacy, but without much in the way of 
legitimacy or consent. 
 
At the present time another shift is underway. One way or another, the 
US is losing its sole superpower status, either because of rising 
powers aspiring to superpower status (most obviously China), or 
because power is diffusing and we are heading towards a world 
without superpowers. The first scenario suggests a return to an 
adversarial BoP and therefore a weak GPM. The second suggests a 
fading away of BoP and the rise of a rather novel international 
structure that opens questions of whether GPM will be weak or strong, 
and how it will relate to ‘global governance’. We return to this question 
in section 6.  
 
3. System Structure and GPM 
 
As noted in the Introduction, GPM shares with other IR theories both a 
strong interest in the material distribution of power (aka polarity), and a 
fundamental commitment to taking into account the ideational structure 
of international society. Ideas about material and ideational structure 
play into the operating conditions for GPM in three obvious ways: the 
distribution of power; the distribution of ideology; and the normative 
substance of the prevailing ideologies. 
 
The distribution of power  
 
In terms of the distribution of power, the standard distinctions are 
among multipolar, bipolar and unipolar systems. As evident from the 
historical discussion in the previous section, GPM has operated under 
all three of these material conditions.  
 
Multipolarity was the historical norm up until 1945, with anything 
                                                        
32 Justin Morris, ‘Normative Innovation and the Great Powers‘, in Alex J. Bellamy, ed., 
International Society and Its Critics ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 265- 
82.  
33  Tim Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’, International 
Relations, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2003), pp. 303-20; Lasmar, ‘Managing Great Powers in the 
Post-Cold War World’. 
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between three and nine great powers in play. The Concert of Europe, 
which some might see as the heyday of GPM, was a multipolar affair, 
and multipolarity was embedded into the UN Security Council in the 
form of the P5. In strategic perspective, multilateralism is generally 
held to make things more complicated by increasing the number of 
players in the game of alliances and BoP, and therefore the number of 
possible disputing or competing dyads. Yet history does not suggest 
that multipolarity is in itself an obstacle to GPM. As Little notes, the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-5 is a classical example of GPM in action 
under conditions both multipolar and pluralist (the great powers had 
significantly different political ideologies).34 GPM under multipolarity 
requires an associational BoP with a pluralist commitment from the 
great powers to a principle of coexistence and tolerance, and some 
agreement about what kind of order is desired. 
 
Bipolar systems are argued by neorealists to be necessarily ones in 
which adversarial balancing dominates, and in this perspective GPM is 
almost certain to be weak. Bull again seems to agree, though his 
analysis is made on empirical rather than theoretical grounds.35 In 
both cases the background of the Cold War seems to dominate 
thinking. Neorealists, for example, never much considered whether 
bipolarity would have been necessarily adversarial if both the Soviet 
Union and the US had been liberal democracies, and as noted there 
was some cooperation between them. Talk of a ‘G2’ as a possibility for 
the US and China hints at the idea that bipolarity might also have 
scope for an associational BoP in which two ideologically disparate 
superpowers might set up a managerial condominium.  
 
Unipolarity, as much discussion of it in the IR literature suggests, is a 
special case. Waltz says little about it, thinking that it is pretty much 
impossible, or unsustainable because it would necessarily trigger 
frenzied counter-hegemonic balancing.36 Bull likewise focuses his 
discussion on systems with two or more great powers, and pretty much 
excludes unipolarity as a form of international society.37 After the 
implosion of the Soviet Union, American neorealists somehow became 
comfortable with talking about a unipolar world order despite the 
                                                        
34 Little, ‘The Balance of Power and Great Power Management’, p. 115.   
35 Bull, ‘The Great Irresponsibles?’.  
36 Waltz, Theory of International Politics.  
37 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 202-5; Little, ‘The Balance of Power and Great 
Power Management’, p. 110; Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations, pp. 
155-6.  
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profound challenge that an absence of balancing, frenzied or 
otherwise, posed to their theoretical position. From a more recent 
English School perspective, Clark picking up on the earlier English 
School interest in hegemonic/hierarchical systems and practices,38 
has developed an argument that legitimate GPM is possible under 
unipolarity, using the same mechanisms of legitimation that apply to 
systems with more than one great power.39 Hegemonic stability theory, 
as noted above, sees a kind of unipolarity as necessary, or at least 
preferable, for the maintenance of a liberal international economic 
order. 
 
There is, however, a further problem with the polarity approach, which 
is the ambiguity about who (or in the case of the EU, what) counts as a 
great power. Neither realists nor the English School have ever come 
up with a satisfactory definition, and history is full of cases of 
‘honourary’ great powers such as Sweden (after 1648), the Ottoman 
Empire (during the 19th century) and France and China (in 1945). We 
are just supposed to know a great power when we see one, and that 
often leaves room for argument. It also makes the category of great 
power uncomfortably broad. Before the First World War there were 
nine great powers, but the gap between Britain, the US and Germany 
on one end of the spectrum, and Italy, Japan and the Ottoman Empire 
on the other, was huge, both militarily and economically.   
 
One key cause of this basic problem is the failure of polarity theory to 
distinguish between great powers and superpowers.40 Waltz’s 
discussion ignores this distinction, seeing only great powers and lesser 
states, and most neorealists have followed his line.41 A bit surprisingly, 
Bull agrees, arguing that the term superpower ‘adds nothing to the old 
                                                        
38 Barry Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2014), pp. 51-56. 
39 Clark, ‘Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony’; Clark, Hegemony in 
International Society. 
40Barry Buzan, and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International 
Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Barry Buzan, The United 
States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Polity, 
2004).  
41 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Schweller’s distinction between ‘poles’ and 
‘middle powers’ is an exception to this rule, as is Huntington’s idea of 
‘uni-multipolarity’. See, Randall L. Schweller, ‘Tripolarity and the Second World War’, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1993), pp. 73-103; Samuel P. 
Huntington, ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (1999), pp. 35-6. 
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one of a “great power”’.42 Polarity theory as currently formulated 
requires the single distinction between great powers and all others to 
be maintained, because otherwise its attractive simplicity disappears. 
While this simple distinction might just about work for the world up to 
1945, after that it increasingly distorts more than it enlightens. Even 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries it can be argued that an 
important distinction was opening up between great powers that 
operated on a fully global scale, most obviously Britain, but also 
France and the US; and those whose operations were mostly regional, 
or in two or three adjacent regions, such as the Ottoman Empire, 
China, Japan, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. Germany and Russia lay 
awkwardly between these two groups. A good case can be made that 
Britain was the first global superpower.43 
 
After 1945, the system structure quickly became bipolar, with two 
superpowers far outstripping all the others on both power and scale of 
global operation. Japan and Germany were knocked into subordinate 
status despite their quick economic recoveries, but Britain, China and 
France had the power, the role, and within the P5 the recognition, to 
still meaningfully be called great powers above the rest. They retained 
some global operation, but became more confined to their home 
regions. The distinction between great and superpowers became even 
more obvious after 1991, when the US became the sole superpower, 
but Russia, the EU, China, and Japan were clearly in a class well 
above the rest. That power structure could only be captured as one 
superpower capable of fully global operation, and four great powers, 
having some global operating capacity, but mainly based in their home 
regions and sometimes in regions adjacent to that. This formulation 
voids polarity theory, and requires more complex and nuanced ways of 
thinking about the distribution of power and its effects.  
 
We argue that this distinction between great powers and superpowers 
will become even more important in the future. If those who argue that 
China and the US will become a superpower duopoly are right, then 
there will be a structure of two superpowers and several great powers. 
If those who argue that the widening diffusion of power and the rise of 
the rest will lead towards a world without superpowers are right, then 
we will be in a world with no superpowers, several great powers, and a 
host of regional powers. In other words, the great powers will only 
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operate relatively weakly at the global level, having their main focus 
within their own regions and immediate neighbouring ones. That kind 
of system structure requires new theorizing. It is not multipolar in the 
traditional sense of that term because the great powers will be 
incapable of competing intensely with each other for global dominance, 
and perhaps, in a post-imperial age, also unwilling to do so. 
 
This discussion suggests that the material factor by itself has neither 
determined GPM in the past, nor defines its potential in the future. 
GPM can work within any distribution of power. Ideas and ideology 
need to be added into the mix. 
 
The distribution of ideology  
 
In terms of the distribution of ideology, one can also use a kind of 
polarity approach. In abstract, it is easy to imagine worlds in which 
there is one dominant ideology (e.g. Tianxia in the classical Chinese 
order), or two (e.g. democratic liberalism vs. communism during the 
Cold War; Christianity vs. Islam in western Eurasia after the 7thC AD); 
or multipolar (e.g. democracy, fascism and communism during the 
interwar years). The suggestion in this approach is that GPM would 
become easier if all shared the same ideology (e.g. the ‘League of 
Democracies’ idea), and more difficult the more ideologies there were 
in play. The English School’s concern with cultural homogeneity as a 
key underpinning for international society supports the hypothesis that 
ideological multipolarity should make GPM more difficult.44 Whether 
the neorealist hypothesis that material bipolarity produces particularly 
intense rivalry can be transposed to the ideational realm is an 
interesting question, but the Cold War case suggests that it can. Again, 
the historical discussion above shows that modern international 
society has lived with all three of these structures, albeit never with 
ideological unipolarity on a global scale.  
 
Ideological multipolarity was in a sense the longstanding condition of 
the premodern world, where each core of civilization had its own 
distinctive religion. There were some encounters among these, such 
as Christianity and Islam, Hinduism and Islam, and Buddhism and 
Confucianism, but these might better be understood as local bipolar 
cases rather than a global multipolar one. The classical era is not really 
a fair case, because the lack of a full global international system45 both 
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prevented systemic rivalry among them and rendered the question of 
GPM marginal or irrelevant. The interwar years, when democracy, 
fascism and communism were all globally in play is a clear modern 
case of ideological multipolarity. The lesson from that period, with its 
sorry story of the weak LN, and failure to agree about how to manage – 
or indeed whether to have – a global capitalist economy, confirms a 
link between ideological multipolarity and the breakdown of GPM. 
 
There are three clear modern cases of ideological bipolarity: monarchy 
vs. republicanism during the 19th century, totalitarian command 
economy vs. democratic market economy during the Cold War, and 
the emerging divide between democratic vs. authoritarian states 
post-Cold War. The lesson from these is that ideational bipolarity does 
not in itself have decisive effects on GPM. There is no doubt that the 
ideological divide between monarchy and republicanism during the 
19th century was deep. Indeed, it might better be understood as a 
conflict between the fundamental principles of dynasticism and popular 
sovereignty.46 This deep ideational bipolarity coincided with a 
multipolar material structure, and yet despite this, for much of the 
period the Concert of Europe represented a heyday of GPM. The 
obvious intervening variable here is imperialism, and the shared 
commitment of the European (and later Western plus Japan) great 
powers to the legitimacy of a two tier Western-colonial international 
society.47 That shared interest and commitment, and the opportunities 
it offered for external expansion rather than zero sum competition in 
Europe, seemed to override even quite deep ideological divisions 
sufficiently to allow for a durable and quite effective GPM regime for 
much of the 19th century. 
 
The ideological bipolarity of the Cold War was intensely zero-sum 
across a wide range of political, economic and social issues, and 
underpinned both the ‘inevitable conflict’ hypothesis of neorealism, and 
Bull’s lament about the ‘great irresponsibles’. The only real shared 
interest between the two superpowers was survival in the face of the 
existential risks posed by nuclear war. Only in that area were the US 
and the Soviet Union able to exercise a limited degree of GPM by 
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promoting arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, and stabilizing 
their spheres in Europe. 
 
The third case of ideological bipolarity is emergent in the divide 
between democratic vs. authoritarian states post-Cold War. Amongst 
the major powers, this puts China and Russia in the authoritarian camp, 
and the Western powers, Japan, India and Brazil in the democratic one. 
This divide is significant, but it is not as deep as that of either the Cold 
War or the 19th century. The key difference, as Buzan and Lawson 
argue, is that now all of the major powers share a substantial 
commitment to global capitalism as the basis of their power and 
prosperity.48 This not only reduces the degree of ideological difference 
among them, but also provides a powerful shared interest in managing 
the global economy. Global economic governance requires much 
broader cooperation than the Cold War interest in nuclear survival. In 
addition, the contemporary group of great powers face a variety of 
shared fate problems including the environment and terrorism that 
pressure them to cooperate. It is too early to tell whether this will play 
out in a weak GPM, or whether the scenario will look more like the 19th 
century in which GPM is carried by a pluralist ‘Concert of Capitalist 
Powers’. 
 
There are no global scale cases of ideological unipolarity. In principle 
one should expect such a condition to facilitate GPM. The classical 
English School makes much of the cultural coherence of early modern 
Europe (‘Christendom’) and classical Greece as the foundation for the 
shared values necessary for international society. Indeed, only 
‘regional’ scale examples of this kind of unipolarity exist, most 
obviously the early modern European case, and the case of Tianxia in 
Northeast Asia. The European case puts ideological unipolarity into a 
context of power multipolarity, and the periodic conferences and 
congresses between the 16th and 18th centuries suggest that this 
combination facilitated a degree of GPM. The Northeast Asian case is 
more varied than classical accounts of the ‘tribute system’ suggest.49 
In periods when China was strong there was an approximation to 
unipolarity of both ideology and power. Its historical record suggests a 
rather mixed outcome in terms of GPM. The Chinese emperor was 
certainly able to exercise a significant degree of legitimate GPM in the 
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region. But this did not work all that well with either the northern 
barbarians or the Japanese, both of whom periodically contested 
China’s position as the central power. 
 
Therefore ideational polarity also does not provide any iron rules for 
GPM. This discussion does suggest that the intensity of ideological 
difference correlates with the difficulty of GPM. Yet it also suggests 
that the availability or not of compelling shared interests, whether 
ideational or material, is an important variable for GPM, and we pick 
this point up below. As well it is clearly not just at the distribution of 
ideologies, but also at the specific normative substance of the ones in 
play. 
 
The normative substance of the prevailing ideologies 
 
In terms of English School theory, GPM can have two normative 
foundations. The first one is pluralist, which means acceptance 
amongst the great powers of a logic of coexistence. That acceptance 
embodies a tolerance of difference, and an acknowledgment of shared 
interests that necessitate a degree of cooperation to be realized. 
Pluralism requires that the differences not be so deep, and of such a 
character, as to be either morally intolerable or existentially threatening 
to the other great power(s). Even where differences are substantial, 
the existence of a strong shared interest or value can suffice to 
override them. This was the case during the Cold War, when each 
camp found the other both morally intolerable and existentially 
threatening, yet they could cooperate to a limited extent when both, 
and indeed humankind as a whole, were existentially threatened by 
nuclear war. Pluralist GPM seems appropriate to international 
societies with two or more great powers and two or more ideologies. 
The second normative foundation is solidarist, which means that the 
great powers are, or want to be, more alike, and therefore share a 
range of important values around which to organize GPM. Solidarist 
GPM points to ideological unipolarity, or if there are two or more 
ideologies in play that the differences between them should be neither 
so deep nor so wide as to eliminate any common ground. Solidarist 
GPM is not much dependent on material polarity. The EU provides a 
regional level case of solidarist GPM.  
 
Since the possible variety of religious and political ideologies both 
historical and potential is more or less infinite, it would be fruitless to try 
to survey them all. A lot seems to hang on the nature and intensity of 
the ideological differences in play, and especially in the case of 
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pluralism, whether there is a strong shared interest or value to help 
override the differences. One response to this problem would be to 
adopt a case-by-case approach, examining the ideologies in play in 
any given case to assess the nature and depth of their differences, and 
their possible compatibilities if any.  
 
Another way is to attempt some broader classification by which 
ideologies might be compared by type. Ideologies range across a 
spectrum from universal, open and inclusive, to parochial, closed, and 
exclusive. Universal, open, inclusive ideologies rest on the principle 
(and practice) that all people can join them if they agree to take on the 
necessary beliefs and practices. Examples are proselytizing religions 
such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, and political ideologies 
such as liberalism, social democracy and communism. Parochial, 
closed, and exclusive ideologies are those that apply only to particular 
people and are either impossible or very difficult for outsiders to join. 
Examples are race ideologies positing the superiority of one race or 
people over others (white supremacy, Aryanism); ‘chosen people’ 
religions; or nationalisms defined in terms of deep and strong cultural 
exceptionalism, such as Chinese and Japanese. In a way, nationalism 
sits awkwardly between these two extremes, being universal in the 
sense that all peoples are entitled to the political rights of 
self-government associated with being a nation, but exclusive in the 
sense that all national identities reflect cultural and linguistic 
differences that are a barrier to entry. It is fairly easy for outsiders to 
become American, Canadian or Brazilian; possible, though more 
difficult, for outsiders to become British or French; and very difficult for 
outsiders to become Japanese, Korean or Israeli. Race ideologies are 
almost by definition exclusive and closed. Cultural ideologies are in 
principle open and inclusive, but the barriers to entry (and exit!) vary 
from quite low to extremely high. In classical China, for example, 
barbarians could become civilized by acquiring Confucian culture and 
observing its rituals – and Han could become barbarian by ceasing to 
observe the rituals. A classification approach along these lines is not 
incompatible with the case-by-case one: organization by type can be 
used to facilitate case-by-case comparisons. 
 
This fairly simple classification approach offers some insights into 
whether any particular normative and material configuration will have 
scope for GPM or not. It seems, for example, safe to say that where 
ideological bipolarity takes the form of two universal ideologies, the 
scope for pluralist GPM will be low or zero (e.g. Christianity vs. Islam; 
offensive liberalism vs. communism). Such a pairing is by definition 
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zero sum unless there is some exceptionally strong intervening shared 
interest (e.g. survival during the Cold War) to mediate it. Two or more 
universalist ideologies will not be able to muster much in the way of 
pluralist GPM, and will be unable to pursue solidarist GPM unless one 
of them comes to dominate. At the other end of the spectrum the 
pattern is less clear because the character of parochial ideologies 
comes in two forms. One form is defensive and isolationist in which a 
cultural group simply wants the right to survive and coexist (e.g. 
American isolationism during the 19th century). The other is offensive 
and aggressive, in which a culture group claims the right to absorb, or 
dominate, or exterminate and replace, others (e.g. white supremacy, 
the Nazi lebensraum and eugenics projects; the Japanese empire). 
Defensive, parochial ideologies might well provide the most fertile 
ground for pluralist GPM. Offensive parochialisms, like bad apples in a 
basket, will reduce the scope for GPM of any kind.  
 
Both kinds of parochial ideology will have trouble coexisting with a 
universal one. An offensive parochial one will create a zero-sum 
situation comparable to that of two competing universalisms. An 
example here might be the conflict that shaped the Second World War 
between two offensive parochialisms (Germany and Japan) and two 
universalist ones (liberalism and communism). A defensive parochial 
ideology will necessarily resist the pressure from the universal one to 
homogenize the system. Contemporary examples of countries that 
might be thought of as mainly defensive parochial – such as Russia, 
Iran and China – clearly feel under siege by the intrusive tyranny of 
liberal universalism, usefully reminding us of Simpson’s observation, 
that the ‘legalised hegemony’ of the great powers has its roots in the 
‘standard of civilization’ thinking of the 19th century.50  
 
This combination is perhaps a useful lens through which to examine 
the contemporary US-China relationship. The US clearly represents a 
universal, inclusive ideology, and consequently puts sustained 
pressure on China to come into line with that. On the other hand, China 
is on the parochial side of the equation. The ideological universalism of 
the Maoist period has been decisively abandoned, and the 
government’s main aim is the parochial one of domestic social stability 
and continuing economic growth under community party rule. China’s 
longstanding mantra of ‘Chinese characteristics’ suggests a desire to 
preserve a distinctive culture and politics from the intrusions of 
offensive liberal universalism. Whether China is a defensive or 
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offensive parochialism is, however, difficult to say. Up until 2008, its 
rhetoric of ‘peaceful rise/development’, and much of its behaviour, 
suggested a defensive parochialism. Since then, China’s apparent 
assertive turn has generated increasing international concerns,51 
especially its increasing propensity for military swaggering, and the 
subtext in its rhetoric of a big power having the right to regional 
primacy in East Asia, seem all point to a more offensive parochialism. 
One solution to this puzzle is to say that the shift simply represents 
China’s response to its rising power. Another is to say that China was 
always an offensive parochial power, but it adopted a rhetoric of 
peaceful rise/development to hide this, and bide its time until it was 
strong enough to show its real face: a classic, Art of War strategy of 
deception. Yet another is to say that Chinese foreign policy making is 
incoherent, often sending contradictory signals, and hence causing 
confusions and misperceptions to outsiders.52 Thus, even though 
China has been actively promoting a new type of major power relations, 
especially with US, mistrust between them remains strong over their 
mutual provocations in the South China Sea and their general rivalry in 
the Asia-Pacific region. It is not just the particular issues that divide 
them, but the structural tension between an offensive universalist and 
a parochial one, whether offensive or defensive. 
 
This uncertainty is what lies at the heart of the contemporary problem 
about GPM. In either its defensive or offensive interpretation, China’s 
ideological parochialism will be in tension with liberal universalism, 
though the tension will be higher if China’s parochialism is offensive 
and it attempts to ‘return to normal’ by regaining its primacy in East 
Asia. However, there are intervening variables. First, China’s 
parochialism requires that it remain engaged with the global economy, 
because the continued growth of its wealth and power, and its 
domestic political stability, depend on that engagement. Moreover, as 
a rising power, China has taken the legitimation of its rising power very 
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seriously, because it knows the social and relational nature of the 
recognition.53 China is also not immune to other shared fate issues, 
from the environment to terrorism, that it cannot adequately address by 
itself. Perhaps it is in this context that China proposed the concept of 
community of common destiny in recent years, though outsiders as yet 
have been given insufficient clarification to be able to assess what this 
rather vague concept might mean. The contemporary US-China 
relationship thus looks like a case of fairly strong and fairly deep 
differences mediated by a very strong shared interest. There should 
therefore be some scope for pluralist GPM in this formation.  
 
Although material and ideational structure give us some useful handles 
on GPM they do not provide simple formulas or mechanical predictions. 
Each case needs to be examined for the particular characteristics of 
the ideologies in play, and for possible common ground provided by 
intervening variables of shared interests. System structure also 
suggests that the environment and facilitating conditions for GPM 
change over time, not only in terms of the distribution of material power 
and ideological disposition, but also in terms of the substantive content 
of the ideologies in play. Dynasticism represented one form of 
universal normative political order, liberalism another, and communism 
yet another. That being the case, one should expect the functions of 
GPM to change along with shifts in the material and normative 
environment.  
 
4. The Functions of GPM 
 
A useful place to start thinking about the functions of GPM is Watson’s  
idea of raison de système, defined as ‘the belief that it pays to make 
the system work’.54 It stands as a counterpoint to the idea of raison 
d’etat, which is explicitly central to realism, and implicitly to much 
Western IR theory. GPM means that great powers must take 
responsibility for making the system work, but exactly what needs to be 
done to ‘make the system work’ depends on what kind of material and 
normative structure (aka international society) is in place. There is a 
considerable difference between the functional requirements of a 
mainly dynastic, mercantilist, imperialist international society, like that 
of the 19th century Concert of Europe, and a mainly liberal, capitalist 
one with a global economy as at present. Likewise, a system with high 
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interaction capacity (railways, container ships, aircraft, the internet) 
and high economic interdependence will present different functional 
priorities from one with low interaction capacity (muscle and wind 
powered transportation) and largely local economic and political 
dynamics. It is no accident that the first functional IGOs were 
established in the latter part of the 19th century, when new industrial 
technologies generated strong imperatives for global standards and 
inter-operability. We should expect the functions of GPM to evolve 
over time as the general character of international society and its 
particular suite of primary institutions evolves.55 
 
In the space available here we can offer no more than a brief sketch of 
how the functions of GPM have changed over time: this topic could 
easily support a book-length treatment. Our approach is to look at the 
evolution of GPM mainly through the lens of security. Bull’s  
foundational discussion of GPM is firmly rooted in the traditional, 
military-political security agenda, and is broadly representative of the 
world up until 1945.56 These traditional functions do not disappear 
after 1945, but they change in context and priority, and are 
increasingly accompanied by new functions that emerged from the 
wider and deeper understanding of security.57 As the so-called 
non-traditional security (NTS) agenda comes into play, the functions of 
GPM expand into economic, environmental, health, human, and 
identity security. Bukovansky et al. note that ‘the special 
responsibilities that have been attached to great powers in the past 
have been narrowly focused upon managing the security aspects of 
international order’.58 They go on to suggest that the widening of the 
security agenda has extended and deepened what is accepted as the 
special responsibilities of great powers. This is an important insight. It 
provides both a driving force and a legitimating framework for tracking 
how and why the functions of GPM have changed over time. In this 
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section we use the well-understood evolution of the international 
security agenda from a purely traditional one, to one that is wider and 
deeper, to map the corresponding functional changes in GPM.59  
 
The functions defined by the traditional (i.e. military-political) security 
agenda are well set out by Bull,60 who argues that the basic role of 
great powers is to manage their relations with each other and to ‘impart 
a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a 
whole’. This nicely differentiates raison de système from raison d’etat. 
More specifically he identifies six functions for GPM (the examples are 
ours not Bull’s): 
1. To preserve the general BoP (e.g. external balancing, as in the 
negotiated partition of Africa at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5; 
and of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War; and 
internal balancing, as in the US-Soviet arms control agreements 
during the Cold War); 
2. To avoid or control central crises (e.g. as in the intended 
purpose of the League of Nations and the UN Security Council; 
the US-Soviet diplomacy during the Cuba Missiles Crisis; and 
various confidence-building measures); 
3. To limit or contain central wars (e.g. through arms control 
agreements); 
4. To exploit their local preponderance to maintain regional order 
(e.g. the US’s Monroe Doctrine; Japan’s Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere; classical China’s tribute system – this 
becomes problematic when there is more than one great power 
in a region); 
5. To respect each other’s spheres of influence (e.g. as between 
Portugal and Spain in the treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and 
Zaragoza (1529); and the US and the USSR in Europe after 
1948); and 
6. To take joint actions (e.g. the Eight-nation expedition in 1900 to 
relieve the Europeans under siege in Beijing by Boxer forces; 
some of the collective measures taken to limit nuclear 
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proliferation and to combat terrorism; and the recent anti-piracy 
operations off Somalia). 
 
Perhaps the clearest model for this traditional security view of GPM is 
the Concert of Europe, which operated along these lines from the 
Treaty of Vienna to the middle of the 19th century, and more 
sporadically thereafter. Bull argues that excessively disorderly 
relations amongst the great powers will undermine the legitimacy of 
GPM, and that the great powers need to cultivate that legitimacy by 
paying at least some attention to the justice demands of the lesser 
powers.61 This pluralist agenda largely reflects the circumstances of a 
multipolar, imperial international society in which great power war is a 
possibility. But as our examples show, it also covers the bipolar Cold 
War and more recent activities. So while this traditional military-political 
security agenda has certainly not disappeared, both the ending of the 
Cold War and the increasing normative and material restraints on 
racism, imperialism and great power war and violence, mean that it 
has declined in importance relative to the NTS agenda.  
 
That said, there are four areas in which the traditional security agenda 
still drives the functions of GPM. First, it is conceivable that the issue of 
great powers managing their relations with each other could regain its 
centrality: scenarios of Russian expansionism, and US-Chinese rivalry 
over primacy in East Asia, could unfold into a new kind of spheres of 
influence game, and even cold war. This would pitch the closed, 
parochial, exclusive and authoritarian great powers against the open, 
universalist, inclusive and democratic ones which could either weaken 
GPM by setting the great powers against each other, or increase 
demand for it by raising fears of war. Second, traditional GPM remains 
important in the ongoing attempts to restrict the spread of nuclear 
weapons and their delivery systems. This issue is still capable of 
mobilising great power joint actions, as in sanctions against Iran, the 
Six-Party Talks about North Korea, and (falsely) against Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq. It is one of the notable continuities on the 
agenda of international security across the otherwise big divide at the 
ending of the Cold War.62 
 
Third, The violence problem is now much less about state-to-state 
conflict than about violence either within states (weak and failed states 
– where the state, or those who compete to control it, are the main 
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threat to the citizens), or between non-state transnational actors and 
states (terrorism and crime). Among the conflicts happening between 
the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 21st century, 89 
conflicts out of the 116 were purely intrastate or civil wars, and another 
20 were intrastate with foreign intervention.63 Moreover, as witnessed 
in the humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Kosovo and 
elsewhere, parties in these conflicts paid little regard to established 
rules of war, and it has been the increased vulnerability of civilians like 
women and children who were targeted with a level of brutality.64 The 
resulting cases of genocide and mass violence brought enormous 
pressure both on the great powers and international society as whole 
to do something to save innocent lives. As Morris argues, while Cold 
War constraints reasonably justified inaction, now failure to do 
something endangered liberal democratic ideals.65 It was in this 
context that a major change occurred in the normative structure of 
international society and security in the post-Cold War era. These 
problems fit into the traditional agenda in being threats that are for the 
most part intentionally made by organized groups of human beings 
against each other. Especially in relation to weak and failed states, this 
type of violence also raises issues of human rights and human security. 
Human rights and human security make individuals and people the 
main referent object, which creates significant tensions with the 
sovereign state framing of both international society and traditional 
international security. 
 
Fourth, as Lasmar argues, transnational terrorism is in one sense an 
extension of the traditional GPM security agenda about violence. But 
he also hints that, in another sense, transnational terrorism, especially 
since 2001, has turned the traditional agenda inside out because the 
threat it creates is ‘neither state based nor state generated’.66 As 
reflected in the literature on international security, there can be no 
doubt that the attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent global war on terror 
(GWoT) had an enormous impact on the understanding of traditional 
security.67 The old state-versus-state agenda did not disappear, but 
alongside it was now a transnational violence threat between non-state 
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actors and states. In part this threat could be read as wanting to 
remake some parts of the states-system in a different way, as for 
example in Islamic State’s attempt to reconfigure Syria and Iraq. But it 
could also be read as a much more profound assault on the very 
principle of sovereign, territorial states that underpins both 
international society and GPM. Despite being about violence, the 
GWoT constructed a threat that looked more like the non-military ones 
on the wider NTS agenda because it threatened all of the great powers 
together. It took them out of their traditional comfort zone of dealing 
with the balance of power among themselves, and into the problem of 
how collectively to confront shared transnational threats. The threat 
from transnational terrorism can never be eliminated, only managed. It 
threatens the sovereignty and territoriality of all states, not just great 
powers, and it is hardly surprising that on this issue Russia and China 
quickly got on side with the US regardless of their ongoing hostility to it. 
The threat from transnational terrorism links to that from nuclear 
proliferation, making these the dominant post-Cold War issues on the 
traditional military-political security agenda of GPM. 
 
Because of this element of collective threat, the problem of terrorism 
provides a useful transition to the changing functions of GPM that 
developed as the NTS agenda took root. Like terrorism, the wider 
security agenda has a transnational dimension that differs from the 
traditional security agenda of GPM. Challenges such as air pollution, 
financial crises, terrorism, migration, disease, cyber-security, 
transnational crime and nuclear pollution – can and do spill over 
territorial borders and create a wide range of security threats and 
sources of instability.68 But unlike terrorism, much of the NTS agenda 
is about a range of functional issues that do not necessarily, or even 
usually, link to political violence. Since no single country can address 
these threats on its own, greater cooperation is necessary for effective 
security governance.69 In this sense, rather than managing the BOP, 
whether adversarial or associational, cooperation is the essential 
requirement if great powers wish to effectively tackle these new 
challenges. Relations between the US and China exemplify the mixed 
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character of this new security environment in that while they compete 
with each other in some ways,70 they also cooperate in many NTS 
areas including the GWoT and more recently in tackling climate 
change. Issues such as climate change and disease are clearly shared 
threats/fates faced by all. But some issues cut both ways: terrorism 
and cyber-security could be as much about rivalry between powers as 
about shared fates. 
 
The decline of the great power military security agenda, and the rise of 
the NTS one is generally tracked back to the 1970s when the oil crises 
put economic security onto the agenda, and the first stirrings of 
environmental security began to be heard. Since then, the discipline of 
IR has been integrating economic, and to an increasing extent, 
environmental, interdependence into its thinking about international 
security. Yet while this dating is an accurate reflection of the IR 
security literature, it is not an accurate representation of the functions 
of GPM. Even at its time of writing, Bull’s rather pluralist, traditional 
security list of GPM functions displayed a striking indifference to 
another quite longstanding interest, shared amongst many great 
powers, in maintaining an orderly global economy: what is now called 
global economic governance (GEG).71 GEG is not mainly a pluralist 
goal (i.e. one aimed at a degree of peaceful coexistence), but more a 
solidarist one (i.e. aimed at pursuing a joint goal or value, in this case 
facilitating trade and finance across state boundaries in the belief that 
this will increase wealth and development faster than protectionist 
alternatives). Early examples of this as a function of GPM include the 
long history of gold standards for currency; and the negotiation of free 
trade and ‘most-favoured nation’ agreements, which took off during the 
19th century and became institutionalised in the GATT and the WTO 
after the Second World War. Although more than a security issue, 
GEG now counts as part of NTS as ‘economic security’. But in fact it 
has been a longstanding function of GPM. When Britain and later the 
US were the leading industrial powers, both took the promotion of free 
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trade seriously, and during the previous two centuries led many rounds 
of negotiations towards that end, some successful, some not, but all 
driven not only by the idea that fostering economic openness and 
interdependence would increase prosperity, but also that it would 
reduce the risk of war. As mentioned above, hegemonic stability theory 
puts such economic management, and provision of collective goods, at 
the core of GPM. There is no doubt that the history of GEG has been 
very up and down. Low points include both world wars, and the retreat 
into segmentary imperial preference after the great financial crash of 
1929. Along the way many great powers have either tried to protect 
themselves, and promote their own industrial development, by 
resorting to high tariffs and other restraints on trade, (like the US and 
Germany during the 19th century), or by pursuing anti-capitalist 
mercantilist policies of self-reliance (like the Soviet Union and Mao’s 
China).  
 
But as Buzan and Lawson argue, since 1945 there has been widening 
acceptance amongst the great powers, that a global form of capitalism 
is the most effective route to the pursuit of wealth and power.72 After 
1945, this view consolidated itself in the West under American 
leadership and became one of the key defining features of the Cold 
War. China switched to this view with Deng’s reform and opening up 
from the late 1970s, and by the late 1980s the Soviet Union had 
decisively lost the struggle to maintain the credibility of its command 
economy as an alternative. Since then, all of the great powers have 
pursued their own quite distinct versions of capitalism (liberal 
democratic, social democratic, competitive authoritarian, and state 
bureaucratic), yet despite these differences all are committed to the 
idea that capitalism works best to deliver wealth and power when it 
operates globally. That commitment necessitates the maintenance and 
renewal of the suite of rules, regimes and IGOs without which the 
global economy cannot function efficiently.73 Despite the many 
controversies that surround its complex and ever-changing agenda, 
GEG now counts as one of the core functions of contemporary GPM. 
Arguably, given the massive constraints placed on great power wars 
by the cost and destructiveness of modern military technology,74 GEG 
has displaced the traditional military/political concerns as the first 
priority for GPM. 
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Since the 1970s, environmental security, and particularly climate 
change, has also consolidated itself as part of NTS, and therefore the 
GPM agenda. Like economic security, it fits into the framing of shared 
transnational threats involving unintentional structural disruptions that 
will disproportionately affect the weak. The idea of environmental 
stewardship has since the 1970s acquired a host of international 
conferences, conventions, treaties and protocols, and some standing 
in international law. Falkner sees the main developments arising from 
the 1960s, tracking the rise of environmental norms within international 
society, and seeing the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the Rio 
summit of 1992 as particular landmarks. He makes a clear case that 
environmental stewardship is now established as a legitimate basis for 
moral claims in international society even though there is still 
disagreement about whether or not the problem exists.75 Bull argues 
that disagreement about environmental problems is intrinsic to the 
issues concerned, and that international society is the best place to 
start addressing the issue.76 Reus-Smit hints at the emergence of a 
green moral purpose of the state, and Hurrell emphasizes both the 
inescapable role of states as part of the problem and part of the 
solution, and the way in which environmental issues have pushed 
forward the process of global governance.77 The agreement reached 
for the final draft at the Paris 2015 climate summit demonstrates both 
that developed and developing countries now accept the fact that 
climate change is a global challenge faced by all, and that the 
leadership of the great powers, especially the US, China, the EU and 
India, is still crucial. 
 
Since the 1970s, because of both the rise of the global economy as a 
factor of international order, and the decline of great power war as a 
daily concern, the widening and deepening of the international security 
agenda has continued to add new functions to contemporary GPM. 
Some of these are threats to international order that are for the most 
part unintentional, and usually not made by humans against each other: 
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what Galtung called structural violence.78 Here we have in mind 
environmental threats that range from epidemic diseases, through the 
risk from space rocks hitting earth, to climate change, but also social 
ones such as when migration is constructed as a threat to identity.79 
These threats have mainly natural causes, but some of them, 
particularly migration, transnational crime and cyber-security are 
driven by the same dramatic economic and technological 
developments that have shrunk time and space, and elevated the 
global economy to the first rank of GPM concerns.  
 
As Hurrell and Woods note, many non-military security threats, such 
as transnational crime, drug/human trafficking, refugees, pandemics 
and environmental degradation, have emerged ‘not from state strength, 
military power, and geopolitical ambition, but rather from state 
weakness’.80 One of the serious implications of these new security 
threats is that they often cause greatest harm to the most vulnerable 
individuals and groups. As Cindy Yik-yi Chu’s study of human 
trafficking in China shows, the threat from organised crime constitutes 
a ‘contemporary form of slavery’ because it involves prolonged 
exploitation of men, women, and children.81 Importantly, in respect of 
the question of ‘security for whom’, the state is no longer the only 
referent object of security: under the wider agenda other referent 
objects, such as individuals, groups, even ecological systems, have 
now been recognised.82 From this new perspective, the traditional 
approaches to security precisely have ignored the security of the 
marginal, the poor, and the voiceless.83 One indicator of this functional 
shift in GPM is the rising role of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and 
their attraction to states such as China and Japan seeking to 
strengthen their legitimacy as great powers.84 
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Another indicator is the growing importance of human rights and 
human security on the GPM agenda. The UNDP identified seven 
components of human security (including economic, food, health, 
environment, personal, community and political).85 Human security is 
about not only direct physical violence, but also by many other threats, 
such as structural violence, environmental causes and natural 
disasters. In a more positive sense it is about freedom from fear and 
want, and freedom to live in safety and dignity.86 Increasingly, this 
broader understanding of security has gained greater acceptance in 
ways that put it onto the GPM agenda. This dates back to at least 1948, 
when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) made 
individual human beings ‘right holders on their own behalf’.87 Since 
then, human rights have become embodied not only in the Charter of 
the UN,88 but also in many UN Conventions and Committees, and in 
many regional bodies. The UN has a Human Rights Council, and there 
is a body of international humanitarian law. In 2001, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
popularised the concept of humanitarian intervention and 
democracy-restoring intervention under the name of ‘Responsibility to 
protect’ (R2P). It explicitly stated that ‘sovereignty implies a dual 
responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and 
internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within 
the state’.89 The UN World Summit in 2005 formally endorsed the 
concept of sovereignty as responsibility. It clearly stated that ‘[E]ach 
individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
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genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’.90 
 
Yet as Foot observes, these solidarist underpinnings were also 
balanced by pluralism: reaffirming membership in a world of individual 
states, and noting the need to build state capacity. Thus, ‘R2P could be 
seen to represent a search for balance between human and state 
security’ .91 Welsh likewise sees progress since the 1990s in attaching 
responsibility for human rights to sovereign states, but still holds great 
hesitation on the part of international society to intervene on 
humanitarian grounds.92 Despite these cautions, over the years 
humanitarian norms have gained increasing acceptance: as Wheeler 
argues, since the end of the Cold War a new norm of humanitarian 
intervention is emerging, linked to legitimation by the UN Security 
Council.93 Mayall and Donnelly both see human rights as having 
becoming influential in international society albeit far from universally.94 
With these growing humanitarian considerations even health issues 
can now be seen as existential threats to international society. For 
example, in 2000, the UN Security Council (1308 Resolution) for the 
first time in its history declared a health issue (HIV/AIDS) as a threat to 
international peace and security. The 2014 Ebola crisis has again 
highlighted the particular vulnerability of countries with ‘low human 
development, high political instability and weak governance 
capacity’.95 
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Particularly with the ending of the Cold War, and the triumph of global 
capitalism, it might be argued that the normative structure of 
international society has undergone a substantial shift, in the process 
generating new functions for GPM. For more than a decade, the end of 
the Cold War radically changed the global distribution of power, and 
seemed to put the Western powers in a position of overwhelming 
power able to advocate new norms. In many ways international society 
still remains parochial and pluralist, but on top of that there is now a 
significant layer of more universalist values, diverse functions for GPM, 
and state-centric solidarism, not just about the global market economy 
and environmental stewardship, but also about human rights and 
human security, terrorism and cyber-security.96 During the Cold War 
this important normative shift into the wider security agenda remained 
somewhat in the background of GPM. But with the end of the Cold War, 
it moved into the foreground.  
 
5. GPM in the 21st Century 
 
Taking this general framing into account, where are we now in the 
story of GPM, and where does it seem to be heading? We can begin to 
answer this question by looking at the system structure variables set 
out in section 3 and the functions reviewed in section 4.  
 
As noted in the discussion of the distribution of power in section 3, the 
simple categories of classical polarity theory now mislead more than 
they clarify. Some see the decades ahead in the form of two 
superpowers (China and the US) with a variety of great powers (the 
main candidates being the EU, Russia, India, and possibly Japan and 
Brazil). Others see a world without superpowers, but with several great 
powers and many regional ones. Neither of these scenarios fits within 
the logic of polarity theory. The two superpowers plus X great powers 
model violates the basic rule of polarity theory that there can only be 
one level of distinction: great powers vs. all the rest. The world without 
superpowers bears a superficial but deceptive resemblance to 
multipolarity. It is not multipolarity, because on a global scale the great 
powers have neither the capacity nor the will to compete with each 
other intensively to dominate the system. Decentred globalism is a 
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new structural form that has not yet been theorised.97  
 
Polarity theory expects two superpowers to take a global view of GPM, 
and to be in competition to dominate international society. It does not 
say how a set of great powers would view GPM in the absence of any 
superpowers, but it seems reasonable to hypothesise that great 
powers would have both less global capacity materially, and a less 
global outlook, than superpowers. The 19th century Concert of Europe 
offers some evidence that a society of great powers can mobilise itself 
for active GPM. But against that there is a worrying prospect that the 
set of great powers that will be in place over the coming decades is 
likely to be composed of states that are inward-looking to the point of 
being autistic. In individuals autism is about abnormal or impaired 
development that leaves people much more internally referenced than 
shaped by interactions with others. In states it can be understood as 
where reaction to external inputs is based much more on the internal 
processes of the state – its domestic political bargains, party rivalries, 
pandering to public opinion (whether it be nationalist or isolationist), 
and suchlike – than on rational, fact-based, assessment of and 
engagement with the other states and societies that constitute 
international society.98 To some extent autism in this sense is a normal 
feature of states. It is built into their political structure that domestic 
factors generally take first priority, whether because that is necessary 
for regime survival, or because the government is designed in such a 
way as to represent its citizens.  
 
But in the current and near future set of great powers, autism will be 
strong for two additional reasons. First, the old, advanced industrial 
great powers (the US, the EU, Japan) are not going to go away, but 
they are exhausted, weakened both materially and in terms of 
legitimacy, and are increasingly unable or unwilling to take the lead. 
The rising great powers (China and India, possibly Brazil) are very 
keen to claim great power status, but equally keen not to let go of their 
status as developing countries. That combination leads them to give 
priority to their own development, to argue that that is a big and difficult 
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job for them, and on that basis to resist being given wider global 
managerial responsibilities. To the extent that states have autistic 
foreign policies they lose touch with their social environment, and fail to 
see how their policies and behaviours affect the way that others see 
and react to them. In such conditions a cycle of prickly 
action-overreaction is likely to prevail, and building trust becomes 
difficult or even impossible, a process already visible in US-China, 
Russia-EU, and China-Japan relations. Everyone sees only their own 
interests, concerns and ‘rightness’, and is blind to the interests, 
concerns and ‘rightness’ of others. If this diagnosis of autism turns out 
to be correct, then we are unlikely to see responsible great powers, 
and more likely to see a decline in GPM as an institution of 21st century 
international society. Autistic great powers lack much global vision 
other than their own self-interest, and will quickly lose the legitimacy 
necessary for GPM. 
 
In terms of the distribution of ideology, the picture is also mixed. There 
remains a kind of ideological bipolarity with democracies on one side 
and authoritarians on the other. In what is fast becoming the 
post-Western age, this divide is taking on strong cultural overtones, 
with authoritarians of various stripes (Chinese, Russian, Islamic) 
claiming cultural legitimacy for their political form. This is a significant 
divide, but perhaps less intense than the ideological divides amongst 
autocracy, fascism, communism and democracy that played out during 
the 20th century. Underlying this divide is the often under-appreciated 
substrate of consensus on many of the underlying norms, rules and 
principles (aka the ‘primary institutions’) of international society: 
sovereignty, territoriality, the market, nationalism, diplomacy, 
international law, human equality, GPM, and suchlike. These primary 
institutions are mainly a legacy of Western hegemony, but many of 
them, most notably sovereignty and nationalism, have become so 
deeply embedded in both state elites and populations that they are 
now as global – and as local – as football (which few now think of as a 
British invention).  
 
With the post-Cold War shift to more or less universal acceptance of 
the market, another powerful dimension has been added to this 
substrate of normative order. This contrasts with the pre-1989 world 
when ideological contestation over such issues was the norm. When 
the vast majority of states are capitalist in some form, the institutions 
and rules required by the global market provide foundations on which a 
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pluralist management of international society might be pursued.99 This 
argument is not meant to underestimate either differences of 
interpretation about these norms (such as over the right of 
non-intervention) or principles over which disagreements remain 
pronounced (such as the universal applicability of human rights). 
Emergent principles such as environmental stewardship could either 
add to the stock of disagreements or, depending on the circumstances, 
to the list of values held in common. But while ideological differences 
do remain, they seem to be less deep and less intense than during the 
20th century. 
 
In terms of the normative substance of international society there is a 
rather complicated picture. On the one hand, there is potential for 
serious tension between closed, parochial and exclusive ideologies 
such as those represented most strongly by China, Russia and Iran, 
and open, universal and inclusive ones represented most strongly by 
the US. A key factor here will be whether these opposing ideologies 
take offensive or defensive forms. Do the parochial powers seek to 
expand their spheres of influence, and do the universalist ones seek to 
impose their values on those who do not share them? On the other 
hand, there are two powerful factors that might mitigate this tension. 
First, is the narrower ideological bandwidth just discussed: all of the 
powers now share a fairly broad agreement about the general form of 
international society. Second, is the existence of the several strong 
shared-fate issues discussed above, and how these drive a wider and 
deeper security agenda to underpin GPM. As argued in section 4, 
shared interests seem to be an important condition for successful GPM, 
able to override both material and ideological polarity. 
 
This general picture of tensions and mitigating factors remains the 
same regardless of whether one’s preferred scenario for the future is 
China and the US as rival superpowers, or a decentred globalist world 
with no superpowers. The US-China rivalry will have much the same 
drivers, and take place against much the same global background, 
regardless of whether it is a global clash between two superpowers, or 
a regional spheres one between two great powers. Even if the 
understanding that the US and China are superpowers prevails, the 
logic of the ‘rise of the rest’, and the diffusion of power will mean that 
they are relatively weak superpowers within a system containing a 
range of increasingly formidable great and regional powers.  
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This overall structural assessment suggests that GPM is not going to 
become obsolete in the decades ahead. If those who anticipate strong 
Sino-US rivalry are correct, then much of the traditional security 
agenda of GPM will come into play. Regardless of this, the demand for 
GPM should also be sustained by the rather durable looking set of 
shared-fate, non-traditional security issues discussed in section 4. This 
structural assessment also suggests that when thinking about GPM in 
the coming decades, it is reasonable to assume a torn logic in which 
GPM might well operate more distinctly on two levels, regional and 
global, than it has at least since the end of the Cold War. This could 
produce a quite diverse picture. On the one hand, the global need for 
GPM is not going to disappear. Indeed, it might well intensify as the 
shared fate issues such as migration, terrorism, cyber-security and 
climate change, get amplified by the ever more tightly interconnected 
and interdependent international system/society. The shared fate 
issues sketched in section 4 affect everyone, and no single power 
under any likely scenario will be able to deal with them alone. On the 
other hand, the ideological and cultural character of the major powers 
will remain quite diverse, and many, possibly all, of them will be autistic 
in their behaviour. These factors are likely to become more influential 
as the hegemony of Western power and culture diminishes from the 
enormous heights it attained during the 19th century. That points 
towards a more regional form of GPM. It is easy to imagine the EU and 
the US running liberal regional orders, and Russia and China leaning 
towards authoritarian hegemonic or even imperial ones. One can also 
imagine condominiums, perhaps China and Russia in Central Asia, 
and conflicts, most obviously the US, Japan and possibly India vs. 
China in East Asia. Regions without great powers, such as 
sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, pose interesting questions. 
They might simply be chaotic and under managed, or they might 
attract intervention from the great powers adjacent to them.  
 
The potential for a two-layer, regional and global, practice of GPM 
raises difficult questions about the criteria for great power legitimacy. 
By Bull’s criteria, failure either to order their relations or to deliver 
adequately on justice demands, might undermine great power 
legitimacy. By Clark’s criteria, great powers seeking legitimacy need to 
display good manners and to provide public goods. These factors 
operate at both global and regional levels, and there is likely to be a lot 
of complicated interplay among them. Great powers that fail either to 
show good manners by respecting the sovereign equality of their 
neighbours, or to deliver adequately on local justice demands, are 
likely to encounter real difficulties in establishing legitimacy as regional 
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managers. Failure to meet justice claims, or to provide adequate 
collective goods in relation to global shared fate issues might also 
undermine great power legitimacy. An intensification of autistic 
behaviour will compromise the ability of the great powers to order 
relations both amongst themselves and in their regions. 
 
A lot could go wrong in a decentred globalist world, especially if that 
world is dominated by a set of autistic, irresponsible, great powers, 
unable and unwilling to order relations amongst themselves or to do 
other than bully smaller powers. There is already a substantial divide 
amongst the great powers about human rights and democracy, and 
potential ones about climate change and cyber-security. It is not clear 
whether the great powers will compete or cooperate on issues such as 
migration, terrorism, and cyber-security, where the incentive still cut 
both ways. Russia, for example, seems happy to ‘attack’ the EU and 
Turkey by stimulating mass migration to them from Syria. At the 
regional level, Europe and the Middle East might both be destabilised 
if Europe and Russia compete there, and the same but worse could 
occur in East Asia if China, Japan and the US fail to order their 
relations. On present trends, we might be facing another period of 
‘great irresponsibles’ where great powers weaken their legitimacy not 
only by failing to deliver on justice claims, but also by abusing their 
neighbours and failing to order relations amongst themselves.  
 
Yet globally, shared fate issues exert a strong pressure on the great 
powers to coordinate their actions, and this pressure is likely to 
increase in the coming decades. To the extent that shared interests 
are the dominant variable in determining the fate of GPM, there are 
also grounds for optimism. We might be facing a post-unipolarity, 
post-Western revival of GPM in a decentred, globalist world. That 
would require that the great powers agree about their spheres of 
influence at the regional level, accept the burden of providing collective 
goods, and face up to the responsibilities that shared fates define for 
humankind. They would have to curb their autistic tendencies, and, as 
in the 19th century Concert of Europe, look first to their shared interests, 
and accept a pluralist norm of tolerance towards their differences. 
 
From where we are now, it looks as if we will get some messy mixture 
of these two. The balance will depend on whether the great powers 
focus more on raison de système, and the need to respond to shared 
fates, or more on raison d’etat, and the pursuit of their own interests, 
obsessions and advantages. Because IR is a dismal science, the latter 
outcome seems more likely. But if we are right about the importance of 
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shared interests to successful GPM regardless of material and 
ideational polarity, then there is a glimmer of hope. The pressure from 
shared fates that affect all of the great powers has never been stronger 
than it is now, and this pressure can only grow. At the same time, the 
divisions among the great powers, though real enough, are shallower 
than they have been for more than a century.  
 
6. Conclusions: GPM and Global Governance 
 
As hinted at above, analyzing GPM through the lens of the widening 
and deepening agenda of international security raises a question of 
both theoretical and practical significance about the management of 
international society: How does the institution of GPM relate to global 
governance? As the process of securitization spreads to ever more 
issues, using the move from the traditional security agenda to the NTS 
one clearly opens up a range of issues that look as much like the GG 
agenda as the GPM one. This constitutes a very dramatic shift in the 
nature of GPM. In effect, the securitization of issues from the economy, 
through migration to public health, has expanded the functions of GPM 
from keeping interstate order to managing complex global governance 
challenges. Since there can be no doubt that the creation and 
management of this expanded agenda involves not just great powers, 
but also lesser states, IGOs, and a whole range of global civil society 
and non-governmental organizations as well, GPM and GG have 
effectively merged. Non-state actors have led the way both on specific 
issues such as the Land Mine Treaty and on more general issues such 
as human rights. Lesser powers have sometimes taken regional 
leadership roles, of which the classic case is ASEAN.100  
 
Yet while this merger of GPM and GG is very apparent from the facts 
on the ground, it has hardly been addressed in the literature in any 
systematic way. The GPM literature, like realism in all its forms, and 
neoliberalism, takes for granted the ongoing, disproportionate 
influence of the great powers in the management of the international 
system/society, and does not look much beyond that. The 
development of the GPM concept came well before the literature on 
GG, yet the ES perspective provides a two-fold link to GG. First, there 
is acknowledgement that world society plays a significant role in 
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shaping the primary institutions of international society.101 This 
acknowledgement opens up space for NSAs. Second, it is clear that 
what Simpson calls the ‘legalised hegemony’102of the great powers 
requires support from the lesser members of international society in 
order to have legitimacy. This was a key reason behind the classical 
ES’s concern over what Bull called ‘the revolt against the West’ by 
newly independent postcolonial states. As Bull and Watson noted: 
Third World governments also maintain with great firmness the 
European doctrine that neither collective security nor financial aid 
nor any other guarantee or arrangement gives the strong powers 
any right to interfere in the domestic relations between the new 
governments and their subjects. They reject any idea of a 
directorate or concert of great powers entitled to ‘lay down the 
law’.103 
As yet, the ES literature has had little to say about the role of IGOs, 
implicitly seeing them as tools of GPM.104 
 
The GG perspective became prominent during the 1990s. It was a 
response to the decline of interest in IGOs and world government,105 
but also more broadly a kind of revolt against the dominance in IR 
thinking of states, great powers and the use of force. Because of this 
orientation, and despite its later start, the GG literature broadly failed to 
make links to the existing literature on GPM. One key reason for this is 
that advocates for GG tend to see great powers more as part of the 
problem. Rosenau argues that global governance is about an ongoing 
relocation of authority upwards and downwards from the state.106 A 
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key driver behind this is the increasing prominence of shared-fate 
issues and the inability of states by themselves to address these.107 
States, including great powers, were having to share power with a 
whole range of NSAs.108 Bukovansky et al. make a big point about 
how special responsibilities have diffused away from great powers to a 
variety of other actors, the mix differing according to the issue.109 The 
general image is one of states of all types and levels of power being 
not only entangled in a web of NSAs and IGOs, but also being 
constrained, and in some ways hollowed out, by global laws, norms, 
and transnational networks. As Weiss puts it: 
‘global governance’ is the sum of the informal and formal values, 
norms, procedures, and institutions that help all actors – states, 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), civil society, transnational 
corporations (TNCs), and individuals – to identify, understand, and 
address trans-boundary problems…. global governance is 
collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide 
problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve. 
As such it may be helpful to think of global governance as the 
capacity with the international system at any moment to provide 
government-like services and public goods in the absence of a 
world government.’110 
 
This perspective of ‘governance without government’ does not, in 
principle, exclude either states in general, or the great powers and 
GPM in particular, as being part of it. But in practice little has been 
done to make this link. Some work in the GG tradition plays down the 
distinction between great powers and other states. Zacher and Sutton  
for example, argue that international regimes reflect both great power 
interests and those of most other states, as does the more general 
framework of sovereignty.111 Other work just leaves the great powers 
out. Weiss though quite familiar with ES work, barely mentions great 
powers, and when he does, it is mainly in the role of Bull’s ‘great 
irresponsibles’, whose inability to agree sets up the problem that GG is 
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trying to address.112 Although he is concerned about the many 
inadequacies and shortcomings of GG in relation to the global 
problems now in play, Weiss confines his prescription to a plea for 
moves towards world government, leaving unexplored the idea that 
GPM might also be an option for strengthening GG. As Hurrell argues, 
the problem with the GG literature is that: ‘power has been neglected 
within liberal writing on global governance’.113  
 
So while in principle nothing stands in the way of thinking about GPM 
and GG, in practice, these literatures have looked in opposite 
directions, almost as oppositional views. How they might be blended 
together is an interesting and important question, and a big enough 
one that to do justice to it will require another paper. As Bukovansky et 
al. argue: ‘The global problems we face today, and the intellectual, 
cultural, organisational and material resources we must mobilise to 
address them, require a much more complex and diverse network of 
“great responsibles” than is envisioned by either state-centric or 
market-centric models of world politics.’114 This feels like a good place 
to start thinking about how to put GPM and GG back together again. 
As Weiss argues, NSAs cannot solve these problems by themselves. 
Doing so in combination with GPM might be a more achievable 
trajectory than waiting for world government. From a GPM perspective, 
linking in to GG provides an opportunity to increase legitimacy, and it is 
more than past time that the academic literature on this caught up with 
the real world practice. 
 
In practical terms, how GPM and GG relate to each other will depend a 
lot on whether the great powers are responsible or autistic. The 
ASEAN case of smaller power leadership, for example, rests on the 
mutual inability of China and Japan to provide consensual GPM in East 
Asia. It therefore suggests not so much a general diffusion of 
managerial responsibility downwards and outwards from the great 
powers, as a specific, and perhaps indicative, role for lesser states 
when great powers fail in their responsibilities. Lesser power regional 
management may be the only option in regions without great powers 
such as Africa and Middle East. Ideally, if the great powers are able 
and willing to exercise their responsibilities, both GPM and GG should 
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be in play to support international society.   
 
As Hurrell notes, the hierarchical order established by the great 
powers during the 19th century remained ‘extraordinarily powerful and 
influential throughout the twentieth century’ including in the formation 
and functioning of the expanding set of IGOs.115 The great powers will 
continue to play a crucial role in world order even as GG extends 
beyond traditional GPM: ‘unsurprisingly, in debates on world order, it is 
the voices of the most powerful that dominate the discussion’. Even the 
work of a dedicated liberal institutionalist such as Ikenberry makes 
strong links between great powers and the creation and function of 
IGOs.116 So while global governance involves both a wider range of 
actors and a more consensual, horizontal, and negotiated character, it 
might still better be seen as necessarily entangled with GPM rather 
than as a replacement for it. The great powers still have the resources 
and interests to dominate IGOs. The management of international 
society is certainly not confined to an exclusive great power club as it 
was during the 19th century, but GPM remains both as an institution of 
international society and as a core component of GG. As argued in the 
previous section, there are strong reasons for pessimism about GPM, 
whether because of general autism amongst the great powers, or 
rivalry between authoritarians and democracies, or inability to adjust to 
the entry of non-Western great powers into the club. If GPM breaks 
down, we will be offered a case study of whether the new form of 
horizontal GG can operate strongly, or even at all, by itself. This will be 
of considerable theoretical interest to IR, but rather unpleasant for 
those who have to live through it. 
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